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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Nature Of The Case
The case before the Court is one in which Appellant, Jackson Hop, LLC ("hereinafter
"Jackson Hop") is seeking to recover an award of prejudgment interest on an arbitration award
made by an arbitration panel against Respondent, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of
Idaho (hereinafter "Farm Bureau") on a first party insurance claim for a fire loss. The District
Court ruled that Jackson Hop was entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9, but
denied to award prejudgment interest on the grounds that the amount owing was unliquidated
and not readily ascertainable by mathematical computation.
Jackson Hop maintained a fire insurance policy with Farm Bureau in the amount of $1.6
million on its hop drying buildings and its equipment/fixtures. On September 16, 2012, a fire
destroyed the buildings and equipment/fixtures. Farm Bureau initially determined the actual
cash value of the property was $380,909 and paid said amount Jackson Hop retained a valuation
opinion for the actual cash value of the property of $1,410,000.
Farm Bureau's policy mandated arbitration on two issues, i.e. whether coverage existed
and if undisputed, what was the value of the loss. Suit was filed and the matter was ordered to
arbitration where on February 21, 2014, the arbitration panel returned a unanimous award of
$740,000 for the buildings and $315,000 for the equipment/fixtures for a total arbitration award
of $1,055,000 which was more than twice the amount Farm Bureaus was willing and did, in fact,
pay on the fire loss claim. In reaching its award, the arbitration panel found that Farm Bureau's
selected appraisers' opinions were not credible or persuasive.
For approximately 15 months after it paid its original tender of $380,909, Farm Bureau
wrongfully withheld $674,091 that Jackson Hop was rightfully entitled as the amount justly due
for its loss. During this time, Jackson Hop lost the use of their money. It is undisputed that
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Jackson Hop was the injured party in this case and but for the filing of this lawsuit, Farm Bureau
would not have reconsidered nor paid the amount justly due under the policy, thereby retaining a
huge windfall for itself.
The purpose of prejudgment interest is not to serve as a penalty against Farm Bureau for
its breach of the policy, but instead, to fully compensate Jackson Hop for the loss of the use of
$674,091 during the pendency of this action.

B. Procedural History
On June 18, 2013, Jackson Hop filed its Complaint against Farm Bureau alleging that
Farm Bureau breached the policy for failing to pay the amount justly due for the loss under its
policy. See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 4-10.
The parties stipulated and agreed to submit the case to arbitration in accordance with the
policy and the District Court entered its Order staying the proceeding on July 24, 2013 which
stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will continue to have jurisdiction over
the above entitled litigation and that further proceedings shall be stayed until the
arbitration has been completed, except to the extent that either party seeks this
Court's intervention to resolve any legal issues that the arbitration panel
does not resolve. (Emphasis added).
The arbitration consisted of a four day evidentiary hearing which commenced on
February 11 through 14, 2014. On or about February 21, 2014, a unanimous arbitration award
was entered finding the actual cash value of the buildings at $740,000 and equipment/fixtures at
$315,000 for a total arbitration award of $1,055,000. In reaching its award, the arbitration panel
found that Farm Bureau's selected appraisers' opinions were not credible or persuasive. See, R.,
Vol. 1, pp. 32-36 and Vol. 3, pp. 355-359.
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On March 4, 2014, Jackson Hop filed it Motion for Attorney Fees, Costs and
Prejudgment Interest, along with a supporting affidavit and memorandum. See, R. Vol. 1, pp.11

Farm Bureau filed its Motion to Disallow Plaintiffs Claim for Attorney Fees and Costs,
along with its supporting affidavit and memorandums. See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 61-91, Vol. 2, pp. 92269, and Vol. 3, pp. 270-421.
On May, 19, 2014, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order that
confirmed the Arbitration Award, granted Jackson Hop's Motion for Attorney Fees, and denied
Jackson Hop's Motion for Costs and Prejudgment Interest. See, R. Vol. 3, pp. 422-437.
On June 20, 2014, the District Court entered a Supplemental Order granting Jackson
Hop's Motion for Supplemental Attorney Fees incurred after March 3, 2014. See, R. Vol. 3, pp.
440-442.
On June 20, 2014, Judgment was entered in the case. See, R. Vol. 3, pp. 438-439.
On July 29, 2014, Jackson Hop filed its Notice of Appeal. See, R. VoL 3, pp. 443-445.
C. Statement o{Facts

On September 16, 2012, Jackson Hop's hop dryer buildings and fixtures/equipment were
destroyed by a fire and rendered a total loss, except for a few pieces of equipment that were
salvageable. See, R., Vol 1, p. 14. At the time of the loss, the subject buildings and its
fixtures/equipment were insured for $1.6 million dollars. See, R., Vol.

p. 99.

On October 24, 2012, Jackson Hop submitted its Sworn Proof of Loss Claim to Farm
Bureau. See, R., Vol 1, p. 10.
Farm Bureau hired Joe Corlett, an MAI Appraiser to appraise and render an opinion of
the "actual cash value" ("ACV") of the buildings destroyed in the fire loss. See, R., Vol. 2, pp.
161-191. Mr. Corlett relied on a definition of ACV obtained on the internet as replacement cost
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minus depreciation, but included a standard of fair market value. See id at p. 168. The
definition of fair market value is what a willing and knowledgeable buyer under no compulsion
to

will pay a willing and knowledgeable seller under no compulsion to sell for a property.
Mr. Corlett referred exclusively to Marshall Swift valuation handbook to compute a

reproduction cost estimate for a tobacco building and its tables for a depreciation rate on a 40
year life expectancy. See id at p. 176. 1 Based on the foregoing, he opined that the reproduction
cost of the subject buildings that existed at the time of the fire would cost $585,205 less a
depreciation rate of 50% for an ACV value of $295,000. See id at p. 177. In arriving at his
opinion, Mr. Corlett factored in the $300,000 purchase price Jackson Hop paid for the property
in 2008. See id at p. 173.
Joe Smith of Valuation Northwest, Inc. was also hired to only prepare an appraisal of the
equipment/fixtures lost in the fire. He defined ACV as replacement cost less depreciation.
Without much analysis or basis in how he arrived at his ACV for each piece of equipment, Mr.
Smith arrived at a total ACV opinion of the lost fixtures/equipment in the amount of $85,909.
See id at p. 180-191. After the lawsuit was filed and expert disclosures were made, it was
discovered that Mr. Smith's ACV opinions were valued at 20-30% of new replacement cost for
each piece of equipment damaged in the loss.
Based on the combined opinions of Mr. Corlett and Mr. Smith of $295,000 and $85,909,
respectively;Farm Bureau paid $380,909 to Jackson Hop for the loss of the subject buildings and
equipment/fixtures on or about November 28, 2012. Farm Bureau's payment of the amount it
believed was justly due to Jackson Hop was less than 25% of the amount Jackson Hop insured
the subject buildings and equipment/fixtures. See, R., Vol. 1, p. 15.

Marshall Valuation handbook on Page 11 of Section 17 reflect the reproduction costs of a tobacco barn or building
which was not comparable to the subject buildings destroyed in the fire.
1
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Jackson Hop disagreed with Farm Bureau's assessment of the ACV of the property
Payne Appraisal
and

West Valley

replacement cost estimates

the buildings and fixture/equipment in order to value the ACV of the subject buildings and
fixtures/equipment. Mr. More's search and investigation for a definition of ACV through
appraisal textbooks and other treatises revealed nothing, but he did discover a definition under
Idaho case law as replacement cost less depreciation. See Boise Assn of Credit Men v.
Insurance Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 P. 523 (1927) and A1anduca Datsun, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 163,676 P2d 1274 (Ct.App.1984). See, R., Vol. 2, pp. 193236.
West Valley Construction had architectural plans prepared of the building and prepared
an estimate of the cost to reproduce the buildings lost in the fire with the same materials and
dimensions. In addition, George Merten, a general contractor who personally constructs the
equipment/fixtures utilized in the hop industry, prepared a replacement cost estimate of the
fixture/equipment that existed in the buildings at the time of the loss which he had personal
knowledge. See id
This information was provided to Mr. More who used and analyzed the cost estimate
with other sources and references, including Marshall and Swift, communications with local hop
producers and other market participants in the Wilder area, and Mary Jane Craigen, Senior Vice
President with Wells Fargo Insurance Services USA in Yakima, Washington who had 45 years
of experience in agricultural coverage and a long family history in the hop industry and
specialized in insuring and handling hop building fire loss claims in Washington state to
determine and test for reasonableness. Mr. More concluded that the replacement cost of the
buildings with like and quality materials was $1,343,000. Based on his research and
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investigation, he determined a depreciation rate of 26.32% based on a 95 year life expectancy for
CMU block buildings and arrived at

ACV of the buildings at $990,000. Mr. More relied on

cost estimate created by George Merten for the fixtures/equipment and added the cost to the
building value for a total ACV opinion of $1,410,000. See id.
Jackson Hop delivered its appraisal report and supporting documentation to Farm Bureau
for its review and reconsideration of the actual cash value of the total loss to its property. Farm
Bureau rejected Jackson Hop's documentation and refused to reconsider the amount it tendered.

See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 30-31, Vol. 2, pp. 238-243 and 245-46.
On June 18, 2013, Jackson filed suit against Farm Bureau. See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 4-10. The
parties stipulated and agreed to submit the case to arbitration in accordance with the policy
which states, in relevant part:

Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to liability coverages, or uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverages. An insured or we may make a written
demand for arbitration to determine all disputed issues as to (1) whether an
insured is entitled under the policy to coverage for a loss, or (2) the value of a loss
to real or personal property where coverage is not disputed. . . . (Emphasis
added).2
Pursuant to the Arbitration Panel's Preliminary Conference Report and Order, a four (4)
day hearing was scheduled to begin on February 11, 2014 and the parties were permitted to
conduct discovery and ordered to simultaneously disclose their expert opinions and rebuttal
opinions at a date certain. See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 16.
On November 8, 2013, Jackson disclosed Jerry Jackson, owner; Mark Richey, a MAI
Appraiser; James More, a General Appraiser; Richard Evans, a general contractor; George
Merten, a general contractor and Brian Smith, a Civil Engineer as expert witnesses and their
opinions. See id.

2

See R., Vol. 2, p. 122.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9

The same day, Farm Bureau disclosed Joe Corlett and Joe Smith as its expert witnesses
rendering the exact same opinions as previously rendered prior to the lawsuit
On January 8,

id.

Farm Bureau submitted its rebuttal opinions disclosing

the first

time, representatives of CSHQA, who rendered an opinion for the reproduction cost of the
buildings; Joe Corlett's amended ACV opinion of $300,000 for the buildings; and Joe Smith's
addendum appraisal for the equipment, raising his opinion to $133,000, and ACV opinion for the
buildings of $333,239. See id. at pp. 16-17.
On January 21, 2014, Farm Bureau paid Jackson an additional $38,239 for the buildings 3
and $47,091 for the equipment. 4 As of January 21, 2014, Farm Bureau paid $333,239 for the
ACV of the buildings and $133,000 for the equipment for a total combined amount of $466,239.

See id. at p. 17.
The foregoing payment which increased the amount justly due previously paid on
November 28, 2012 constituted an admission by Farm Bureau that it failed to originally pay the
amount justly due thus triggering an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839.
On February 11, 2014, the hearing commenced and Jackson Hop presented its evidence
of the ACV of the buildings and equipment. Jackson Hop's ACV opinions for the buildings
were between the range of $800,000 to $1,167,000 and for the equipment between the range of
$379,108 to $399,000. See id. at p. 17.
On February 21, 2014, the Panel entered its Arbitration Award and found that the ACV
of the buildings at $740,000 and the ACV of the equipment at $315,000 for a combined total
ACV award of $1,055,000. In reaching its Arbitration Award, the arbitration panel did not find

The amount was derived from the difference of Mr. Smith's ACV opinion of the buildings of$333,239 less Mr.
Corlett's ACV opinion of$295,000 which was previously paid by Farm Bureau on November 28, 2012.
4 The amount was derived from the difference of Mr. Smith's equipment addendum appraisal of$133,000 less his
original ACV opinion of$85,909 which was previously paid by Farm Bureau on November 28, 2012.

3
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Farm Bureau's selected appraisers persuasive or credible. See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-36 and Vol. 3,
pp. 355-359

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A)

Whether the District Court erred in denying as a matter oflaw that Jackson Hop

was not entitled to an award of prejudgment interest on its arbitration award in the first party
insurance claim.

IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
In Dillon v. Montgomery, 138 Idaho 614,617, 67 P.3d 93, 96 (2003), the Idaho Supreme
Court articulated the standard of review for an award of prejudgment interest as follows:
The standard of review for an award of prejudgment interest concerns an abuse of
discretion. (Citation omitted). To prove an abuse of discretion, this Court applies
a three-factor test. The three factors are: ( 1) whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within
the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the district court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. (Citations omitted).

B. The District Court erred in denying as a matter of law an award of prejudgment
interest in the first party insurance claim.
The District Court held that Jackson Hop could not recover an award of prejudgment
interest on the ground that the damages were not liquidated or readily ascertainable by
mathematical processes or computation. 5 Although, the District Court correctly states the
general proposition of law for awarding prejudgment interest, Idaho law has long held an
exception to this rule of law in the context of first party insurance claims between the insured
and insurer.

5

See, R., Vol. 3, p. 435.
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In Intermountain Association of Credit 1vfen v. lvfilwaukee lv!echanic 's Insurance
Idaho 491, 258 P. 362 (1927), the Idaho Supreme

addressed an award of

prejudgment interest in the context of a first party insurance
In addressing the prejudgment interest issue, the Court expressed the following:
The policy herein provided that payment should be due 60 days after satisfactory
proof of loss was submitted. Under C.S., sec. 2551, "interest is allowed" on
"money after the same becomes due." When, as here, the defendant admits that,
by exhibit "T," it denied liability, and thereafter, by answer, affirmed such denial,
the plaintiff was entitled to interest from the date of the letter. Plaintiff was not
entitled to interest from the date of the fire, nor until it had furnished proof of loss
or established a waiver thereof. (26 CJ. 374.) This action does not come within
the rules controlling allowance of interest upon unliguidated claims for
damages, but rather those applicable in an action for money due upon
contract. Id, 44 Idaho at 500, 258 P. at 365. (Emphasis added).
The Court also noted that under various authorities, interest was allowable and accrued
under several situations including from (1) the date of the fire; (2) the date of the proof of loss;
(3) sixty days after the proof ofloss; (4) denial ofliability; (5) commencement of the action; or
(6) the verdict. See id, 44 Idaho at 497, 258 P. at 364.
In Aviation Industries Inc. v. East and West Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 70 Idaho 28,
211 P.2d 156 (1949), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of prejudgment
interest on the amount found due that was in excess of the amount tendered by the insurance
company.
Specifically, the Court stated:
By specifications of error Nos. VI and VII, appellant complains of the allowance
of interest and costs to the respondent on the ground that no interest after the
tender by appellant, and no costs should have been allowed. This would be true if
the court had found that the amount due was the amount of the tender. However,
where the amount found due by the court was in excess of the tender, then, costs
were properly allowable. (Citation omitted). Also, the amount tendered being
less than the amount found due by the court, such tender did not estop the
accumulation of interest upon any part of the debt. (Citation omitted). Id, 70
Idaho at 32, 211 P.2d at 159. (Emphasis added).
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In Gem State lvfutual Life Ass. v. Gray, 77 Idaho 157,290 P.2d 217 (1955), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that prejudgment n,t."'""'"t was allowed on the amounts due after thirty days
from the date the proof of loss was furnished.
Interest was allowed on the amounts due under the policy and supplement from
the date of the insured's death. The policy provides:
"6-G It is understood that upon the death of a member the Beneficiary
shall within thirty days file with the Association due poof of death and claim."
Respondent's statement of death and claim is dated April 22, 1954. Interest
should not have been allowed prior to the filing of such proof and claim with the
company. (Citations omitted). Id., 77 Idaho at 163-64, 290 P.2d at 221-22.
In Pendlebury v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 89 Idaho 456,470,406 P.2d 129,
138, (1965), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of an award of
prejudgment interest under the insurance policy holding, "[W]hen an insurer denies liability, the
recovering plaintiff is entitled to interest at the legal rate from the date of the denial as for money
due on a contract." (Citations omitted).
In Reynolds v. American Hardware Nfutual Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 362, 766 P.2d 1243
(1988), the Idaho Supreme Court was called on to decide whether Idaho law supported a cause of
action in tort against an insurer for negligently failing to make a timely settlement on a first party
insurance claim. The insurance claim arose from a fire loss of lease-held property. The case
proceeded to a jury trial and the jury awarded the insured damages. Post-trial, the trial court
awarded the insured prejudgment interest from the date of the claim settlement. See id., 115
Idaho at 363-64, 766 P.2d at 1244-45.
On appeal, the Court noted that lawsuit was not based on the fire loss, but instead on the
insurance company's negligence in settling the loss and therefore, Idaho Code § 41-1839 was
inapplicable for an award of attorney fees. See id., 115 Idaho at 366, 766 P.2d at 1247.
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The Court reversed the trial court's decision on prejudgment interest holding,"
the
from

day that the

. the

the insurer's

rendered its verdict.

id, 115 Idaho at 367, 766 P.2d at 1248. The Court went on to explain:
Under claims where contract terms have been entered into evidence, the contract
terms usually define the date that the damages become ascertainable. However,
as noted, supra, contract analysis is inapplicable here because no contract is
in evidence.
With claims involving unliquidated damages, the underlying principle of
calculating prejudgment interest from the point at which the damage claim first
became readily ascertainable remains unchanged. (Citations omitted). However,
it becomes necessary where damages are not liquidated to look to the
individual circumstances in making the determination. On the present facts,
the date on which the jury rendered its verdict becomes the earliest date upon
which the damage claim would begin to accrue prejudgment interest. Id.
(Emphasis added).
In Brinkman v. Aid Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988), the Idaho
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of prejudgment interest on an award of damages arising
in an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim.
The trial court held that prejudgment interest should be allowed on certain fixed
economic damages and awarded prejudgment interest only on past medical expenses and
additional tuition expenses. See id., 115 Idaho at 353, 766 P.2d at 1234. Both parties appealed
the trial court's ruling on the issue.
On appeal, the insurance company argued that the accrual of prejudgment interest was
tolled after it issued several payments on the UIM claim and that prejudgment interest should not
have been awarded on the tuition expense because the amount was not liquidated nor capable of
being ascertained by mathematical computation. See id. Brinkman argued that the trial court
erred in failing to award prejudgment interest on the entire verdict award. See id.
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In response to the insurance company's arguments, the Court stated that the accrual of
interest did not stop on any amounts still due over the tender and that the argument regarding the
tuition expenses was incorrect because it was ascertainable from university publications. See
In response to Brinkman's argument, the Court stated the following:
Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 governs this issue:
28-22-104. Legal rate of interest. - (1) When there is no express contract in
writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is allowed at the rate of twelve
cents on the hundred by the year on:
(1) Money due by express contract.
Aid and Brinkman were parties to an express contract: the underinsured motorist
policy. By the terms of this contract, Aid was obligated to compensate Brinkman
for injuries sustained at the hands of an underinsured motorist. When the
underinsured driver swerved across the center lane and hit Brinkman head-on,
Aid's duty to pay accrued. Had Aid required a proof ofloss, Aid's duty to pay
would have come due when Brinkman submitted his proof of loss statement in the
form of the settlement brochure. In any event, Aid's duty to pay pursuant to the
insurance contract came due prior to trial.
It is significant that Aid's duty arose out of a contract between Aid and Brinkman,
not out of a tort action. Because Aid contracted to insure Brinkman for up to
$300,000 for all injuries and losses suffered at the hands of an underinsured
tortfeasor, Aid is liable for prejudgment interest on the entire amount
awarded by the jury. Prejudgment interest accrues on the general damages
from the date of the accident, because that is the date Aid's contractual
duties accrued. However, to the extent it can be established that certain fixed
damages such as medical expenses were not incurred until a later date, that date
establishes the commencement of the interest obligation. In sum, the entire
verdict is appropriately subject to the accumulation of prejudgment interest,
provided that the three payments of $5,000, $5,000 and $75,000 terminate the
accrual of interest on those amounts as of the dates of their respective payment.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this ruling. Id, 115
Idaho at 353-54, 766 P.2d at 1234-35. (Emphasis added).

Following the Brinkman decision, the Idaho Supreme Court continued to follow the
ruling made on the issue of prejudgment interest.
In Emery v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 244,815 P.2d 442 (1991), the trial court
awarded the insured her attorney fees and prejudgment interest on the entire award which
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proceeded through arbitration. The Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether an
of attorney fees and prejudgment interest could be made in a matter proceeding through
arbitration.
On appeal, the insurance company argued that the trial erred in awarding prejudgment
interest on the general damages because the damages were unliquidated, and not reasonably
ascertainable. The Court rejected this argument and re-affirmed its holding in Brinkman finding
that the trial court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest on the entire arbitration award
commencing from the date of the accident. In affirming the decision, the Court stated:

It is important to note that the Brinkman decision is applicable to a very limited
set of facts. The Brinkman decision is not, as appellant contends, applicable to all
tort actions, or all contract actions. The Brinkman decision is limited to actions
based on first party insurance contract actions involving an underinsured
motorist clause similar to the one contained in Brinkman's insurance policy.
In a situatfon such as this, where an insured files suit against his or her own
insurance company for payment under an underinsured motorist clause, the
insured is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award, including the
award of general damages, from the time of injury. (Citation omitted). Id.,
120 Idaho at 248, 815 P.2d at 446. (Emphasis added).

In Walton v. Hartford Insurance Company, 120 Idaho 616,622,818 P.2d 320,326
(1991 ), the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest on the
entire arbitration award in a UIM claim. ("Accordingly, we are brought to the conclusion that the
district court erred in not awarding prejudgment interest. We also conclude that in underinsured
motorist coverage the interest begins to accrue on the date of the accident").
In Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Insurance Service Co. of Idaho, 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168
(1996), the Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho Code§ 7-910 of Uniform Arbitration Act
granted authority to the arbitrators to award prejudgment interest and costs of arbitration, absent
a contrary agreement between the parties and that these matters had to be brought during the
arbitration. The Court expressed that the failure to bring these matters up in arbitration
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precluded a recovery outside of the arbitration. See id., 128 Idaho at 403, 913 P.2d at 1173.
though the Wolfe decision selected the forum that awarded the prejudgment interest
issue, more importantly, the law in Idaho continued to be that prejudgment interest was
computed on the entire amount of the award, including general damages, from the date of the
accident. In other words, the insured was entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law
under a first party insurance claim based on "money due by express contract" provided by Idaho
Code§ 28-22-104, regardless of whether the amount was liquidated or ascertainable by
mathematical processes.
In Schilling v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 927, 980 P.2d 1014 (1999), the case
involved a UIM claim that went to arbitration where the arbitration panel expressly declined to
award prejudgment interest because of their belief they did not have jurisdiction to do so. See

id., 132 Idaho at 928, 980 P.2d at 1015. The insured petitioned to confirm the arbitration award
and for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The district court modified the award to include
prejudgment interest from the date of the accident. See id. Allstate appealed.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that based on its decision in Wolfe v. Ji'arm

Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,403, 913 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996), the arbitration panel was
erroneous to decline the prejudgment interest issue on the grounds of jurisdiction. See id., 132
Idaho at 929, 980 P.2d at 1016. Notwithstanding, the arbitration panel's failure to address the
prejudgment interest issue at arbitration, the Court affirmed the district court's award of
prejudgment interest to be added to the arbitration award. See id., 132 Idaho at 931, 980 P.2d at
1018.
In Martin v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002), the
case involved a UIM claim that went to arbitration and where the arbitrators awarded
prejudgment interest on the entire arbitration award.
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The issue in Afartin concerned whether the insured was entitled to attorney fees pursuant
to Idaho Code§ 41-1839.

district court denied

was not compelled to bring suit against

insurance company.

request on the grounds that he
Idaho Supreme Court

reversed the district court's ruling finding that the statute did not require the insured to be
compelled to bring an action and that the purpose of the statute was to cause insurance
companies to timely make reasonable offers.
Under the statute, the insurance company has thirty days to tender an "amount
justly due." The thirty days is not delayed or extended while the insurer invokes
the right to arbitration under the insurance contract.
The purpose of the statute is to cause the insurance company to timely make a
reasonable offer and is not dependent on the arbitrators' eventual award. The
insurance company acts at its peril in taking the risk not to tender an "amount
justly due" but, instead, await the arbitration determination. If the insurance
company, in making an offer, should be allowed to rely upon the arbitration
process as a reason for delay, then that condition should be inserted into the
statute by the legislature, not by this Court. Id, 138 Idaho at 248, 61 P.3d at 605.
Again, Martin was entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law on the entire
amount of the award, including general damages.
In American Foreign Insurance Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394, 94 P.3d 699 (2004), the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the arbitrator lacked the jurisdiction to modify the arbitration
award which included prejudgment interest in consideration of the offset amounts provided by
the worker's compensation claim and/or subrogation interests.

Reichert involved an arbitration proceeding to determine an uninsured motorist ("UM")
claim that occurred while the employee was injured during the scope of his employment See id.,
140 Idaho at 397, 94 P.3d at 702. The employer had a UM coverage policy on its vehicles. See

id. The insurance policy contained an offset provision for any benefits paid from a worker
compensation claim. See id The parties agreed to arbitrate the UM claim and the arbitrator
awarded compensatory damages and prejudgment interest on the entire award, including general
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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damages from February 17, 200L See id
American Foreign Insurance

("American")

an application to modify the award

on the grounds that the award contained a miscalculation in that it was required to pay
prejudgment interest on amounts that could be paid by the worker's compensation claim. See id
The arbitrator agreed and modified the award authorizing any lawful offsets to be deducted from
the compensatory damages prior to calculating prejudgment interest. See id., 140 Idaho at 39798, 94 P.3d at 702-03. Reichert refused to pursue his worker's compensation claim and
American filed suit in district court for declaratory relief and breach of contract. See id., 140
Idaho at 398, 94 P.3d at 703.
The district court denied modifying, correcting or vacating the arbitration award and
confirming the award until the worker's compensation claim was determined. See id. The
district court held that once the worker's compensation benefits were determined, the court
would calculate the offset for the benefits received and the prejudgment interest and then confirm
the award. See id. The district court issued a Rule 54(b) certification on its ruling. See id
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the arbitrator erred in modifying the award
on the grounds of an evident miscalculation and affirmed the district court's ruling that the
worker's compensation benefits should be deducted from the arbitration award and the
prejudgment interest recalculated accordingly. See id, 140 Idaho at 401-02, 94 P.3d at 706-07.
Again, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed an award of prejudgment interest on a first
party insurance claim.
In Greenough v. Farm Bureau lvfutual Insurance Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d
1127 (2006), the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Brinkman, Schilling, Emery and Walton only to
the extent of the proposition that prejudgment interest accrued from the date of the accident.
However, the Court made it clear that an award of prejudgment interest was still due in first party
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insurance cases if the insured received more than the amount tendered by the insurance

In insurance cases money becomes due as provided under the express terms
of the insurance contract. Therefore, the insured is not entitled to
prejudgment interest until he or she complies with the applicable contract
provisions. In the current case, the insurance policy stated that payment for
loss would be made sixty days after Farm Bureau received a signed, sworn
proof of loss. Therefore, the insurance money did not begin to accrue, until
sixty days after Greenough Jr. provided Farm Bureau with a sufficient proof
ofloss. Id., 142Idahoat593, 130P.3dat 1131. (Emphasis added).
Greenough Jr. will receive an award of prejudgment interest but it will not be for
the time period provided for in the district court's decision. Id (Emphasis added).
In Cranney v. Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co., 145 Idaho 6, 9, 175 P.3d 168, 171
(2007), an arbitrated UIM case, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Schilling
v. Allstate Ins. Co, supra, in that the failure and/or the award by an arbitrator to award

prejudgment interest in an arbitration proceeding did not constitute an evident miscalculation
under Idaho Code§ 7-913(a)(l) and therefore the district court lacked authority to modify an
arbitration award to include or modify a prejudgment interest award.
In addressing the prejudgment interest issue, the Court expressed the following:
In applying Idaho Code §28-22-104, this Court has held that "damages must be
liquidated or capable of mathematical computation for prejudgment interest to be
awarded." Dillon v. Afontgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 618, 67 P.3d 93, 97 (2003).
Mutual of Enumclaw asks us to hold that prejudgment interest is not recoverable
on an award of benefits under an underinsured motorist policy until the amount
due under the coverage is liquidated. We have already so held. In American
Foreign Insurance Co. v. Reichert, 140 Idaho 394,400, 94 P.3d 699, 7005 (2004),
a case that involved the arbitration of the amount due under an underinsured
motorist coverage, we stated the law regarding the awarding of prejudgment
interest in such cases as follows, "Absent an agreement to the contrary, an
arbitrator has authority under LC. § 7-910 to award prejudgment interest.
Prejudgment interest is allowed on money due by an express contract, LC. § 2822-104, and should be awarded when it is capable of mathematical computation."
In support of that statement, we cited Dillon v. Montgomery, quoted above. Id.,
145 Idaho at 8, 175 P.3d at 170.
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In his specially concurring opinion, Justice W. Jones expressed that in his opinion, Idaho
law allowed prejudgment interest in uninsured and underinsured cases, but that prejudgment
interest should only apply on liquidated amounts from the date the expenses were incurred and
should not be applied to unliquidated claims or future losses. See id., 145 Idaho at 10, 175 P.3d
at 172. In his opinion, Justice W. Jones agreed with the dissent of Justice Walters in the
Schilling decision that it was "basically illogical, unjust and unconscionable to award

prejudgment interest on sums of money representing damages which have not yet occurred,
but which will only occur sometime in the future." See id. (Emphasis added).

Justice W. Jones' concerns on an award of prejudgment interest involved general
damages which included future expenses that would be unknown until a decision was rendered.
Justice W. Jones expressed that adding prejudgment interest on such future expenses constituted
a double recovery by the insured. See id.
Since 1927 when the Idaho Supreme Court decided Intermountain Association of Credit
Afen v. Milwaukee lvfechanic 's Insurance Company, a first part party insurance claim, Idaho law

had consistently allowed prejudgment interest on insurance contracts on the amount due
regardless of whether the amount was liquidated or not As stated by the Court in that case,
"This action does not come within the rules controlling allowance of interest upon
unliguidated claims for damages, but rather those applicable in an action for money due
upon contract. Id., 44 Idaho at 500, 258 P. at 365. (Emphasis added).

For approximately 80 years, Idaho courts and bar have consistently understood the law to
be that prejudgment interest is allowed on damages in first party insurance claims, including
general damages which are universally unliquidated and not readily ascertainable by
mathematical computation. This is evident even in the Cranney decision where Mutual of
Enumclaw requested the Court to hold that prejudgment interest was not recoverable until the
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amount due was liquidated. Only then did the Court state that it had made such a holding in the

Reichert decision relying on its Dillon v. A1ontgomery, 138 Idaho 614, 617, 67 P.3d 93, 96
decision which did not arise from a

party insurance claim between an insured and

insurer.
In Reichert, the Court cited to Dillon for the legal proposition above in a one sentence
statement addressing prejudgment interest.

Thereafter, the Court noted that the arbitrator had

authority and jurisdiction to award prejudgment interest in the arbitration proceeding and
"[F]urthermore, the interest should be calculated using the entire award under the uninsured
motorist clause from the date of the accident." Reichert, 140 Idaho at 400, 94 P.3d at 705.

(Emphasis added). Then, the Court went on to state:
More importantly, the arbitrator recognized American's argument that the
compensatory damages award may be subject to subrogation for worker's
compensation benefits. In recognizing this, the arbitrator stated, "I cannot
consider the effect of subrogation in my decision and do not do so, even with
respect to pre-award interest." Without considering subrogation issues, the
arbitrator awarded $336,023.94 in prejudgment interest. This calculation is not
in error. The arbitrator calculated the maximum allowed by the contract
without taking into consideration the worker's compensation claim or rights
to subrogation.
The February 16, 2001 award contained no evident miscalculation or
misdescription pursuant to LC.§ 7-913(a)(l). (Citation omitted). There was no
mathematical error. The arbitrator determined the maximum compensatory
damages and prejudgment interest allowed without taking into consideration
subrogation issues. This is exactly what he was required to do pursuant to
the amended pre-hearing scheduling order. The arbitrator was not to
concern himself with the potential worker's compensation claim and/or
subrogation issues. The parties agreed to allow the arbitrator to calculate this
type of award. It was error for the arbitrator to modify the award pursuant to LC.
§ 7-913(a)(l) because there were no evident miscalculations. Id., 140 Idaho at
400-01, 94 P.3d at 705-06. (Emphasis added).
The Court's reliance on the Dillon proposition that prejudgment interest should
only be awarded if the damages are liquidated or capable of mathematical computation is
inconsistent with the Court's approval of the arbitrator's award of prejudgment interest
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on the entire arbitration award, including general damages, which is without doubt or
dispute that said type of damages are never liquidated or readily ascertainable by mere
mathematical computation.

It is unclear under Idaho law whether the Court has overruled the longstanding
rule of law that an insured is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award, less
previous amounts tendered by the insurance company, if any, with the Dillon proposition.
Although the Court has cited generally the Dillon proposition approvingly in Reichert
and Cranney, the Court has yet to affirmatively state that prejudgment interest is not
recoverable as a matter of law on general damages or on damages which require reliance
on opinion or discretion in a first party insurance claim. To hold so would effectively
render prejudgment interest unrecoverable in first party insurance claims except in the
rarest of circumstances.
Even in Greenough, supra, which was decided two (2) years after the Reichert
decision and two (2) years prior to the Cranney decision, the Court affirmed and
specifically held that the insured was entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire award,
including general damages, not from the date of the accident as previously held in
Brinkman and its progeny, but after 60 days from furnishing his proof of loss according

to the policy on the amount that was justly due.

If Reichert established the legal standard for allowing prejudgment interest in first
party insurance claims in 2004, the Greenough decision did not specifically nor
definitively hold that prejudgment interest would only be allowed on fixed economic
expenses, and none could be recoverable on the general damages.
The purpose of first party insurance coverage, such as uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage and property loss coverage, is to protect and compensate an insured for
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his or her personal loss which risk is paid for and assumed by the insurance company as a
The insured pays a premium for the coverage for which

msurance

noted above, insurance contracts are
contracts of adhesion with little to no bargaining power by the insured and the insured
accepts the terms as written. A special relationship exists between an insurer and its
insured which requires that parties to deal with each other fairly, honestly and in good
faith. See White v. Unigard, 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986).
The purpose of an insured furnishing a proof of loss to the insurance company is
to provide notice and allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and
liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation and to prevent fraud and imposition
upon it See Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 349-50, 766 P.2d at 1230-3 L
Similarly, the purpose ofldaho Code§ 41-1839 for an award of attorney fees to
an insured who recovers the amount justly due under the policy over and above that
amount tendered by the insurance company, if any, is not a penalty, but an additional sum
of just compensation due the insured for pursuing and prevailing on his claim for the
amount he is justly due. See Halliday v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 89 Idaho 293,
301,404 P.2d 634, 639 (1965). As stated in .Martin supra: "The purpose of the statute is
to cause the insurance company to timely make a reasonable offer and is not dependent
on the arbitrators' eventual award. The insurance company acts at its peril in taking the
risk not to tender an 'amount justly due' but, instead, await the arbitration determination."
138 Idaho at 248, 61 P.3d at 605.
In Ace Realty v. Anderson, I 06 Idaho 742, 682 P.2d 1289 (App.1984), the Idaho Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of prejudgment interest in a context of a sale of a half interest in a
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640 acre farm and interest in the proceeds of crops and cattle. In reversing the district court's
denial in an award of prejudgment interest, the Court

Appeals explained:

We note first that the trial court stated that it would not award the Andersons
interest on "this disputed, unlitigated amount." However, whether prejudgment
interest should be awarded does not depend upon whether the amount
claimed is disputed or unlitigated. (Citations omitted). If it did, prejudgment
interest would never be awarded - a party could delay payment without
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim. We conclude
that the court erred to the extent that it based its decision on whether a claim was
disputed and litigated.
The question of whether prejudgment interest should be awarded is one which is
rarely considered in depth. (Citations omitted). Court are becoming
increasingly liberal in awarding interest as damages for the breach of a
contract where the parties have failed to provide for interest following the
breach, CORBIN, supra at§ 1046, or to compensate for the use or
forebearance of money or for its improper retention. (Citation omitted)
(Emphasis added). Id, 106 Idaho at 751,682 P.2d at 1298.
Farm Bureau agreed and accepted to insure the buildings and equipment for
policy limits of $1,600,000. Farm Bureau was paid premiums on said limits to assume
the risk of a potential loss. Despite knowledge of the limits, Farm Bureau accepted,
without reservation or further inquiry, its selected appraiser's opinions for the total loss
which amounted to less than 25% of the policy limits. Farm Bureau refused to consider
any additional information provided by Jackson Hop which confirmed that the loss was
much greater than that proposed by Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau stood idle on its selected
appraisers' opinions which were found to be not credible and unpersuasive by an
arbitration panel of three (3) members, one of which Farm Bureau selected. Farm
Bureau's position was so unreasonable that it essentially dared Jackson Hop to file suit
and incur the substantial expense oflitigation. Even after receiving Jackson Hop's expert
witness disclosures and opinions, Farm Bureau made no attempt or effort to resolve the
claim prior to the hearing. Farm Bureau's actions forced an all or nothing situation for
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Jackson Hop.
Jackson Hop's damages were liquidated and/or readily ascertainable by
mathematical computation under the policy to be awarded prejudgment
interest as a matter of law.
As stated above, the District Court found that Jackson Hop's damages were not liquidated
or readily ascertainable by mathematical processes or computation and therefore it could not
recover an award of prejudgment interest on the arbitration award of $1,055,000.
In support of its ruling, the District Court cited several non-first party insurance claim
cases, including Dillon v. Montgomery, supra. The facts in Dillon which supported the Idaho
Supreme Court affirming the district court's award of prejudgment interest are strikingly similar
to the instant facts in this appeal.
In Dillon, the parties entered in a stock purchase agreement for the sale of
Montgomery's car dealership in Mountain Home to Dillon. See id, 138 Idaho at 616, 67 P.3d at
95. According to their agreement, Montgomery was to convey his stock for an amount equal to
the Closing Date Net Worth ("CDNW") of the dealership plus $1.5 million. See id After
receiving approval from Ford Motor Company, Dillon attempted to close the transaction. See id
Dillon sought access to the inventory to begin assessing the CDNW. See id Montgomery
denied access and demanded an increase in the purchase price. See id Dillon refused and filed
suit for damages and specific performance. See id
The parties settled the dispute by entering into an amendment to the parties' agreement.
See id The amendment specified that $2.3 million would be delivered to Montgomery and
$200,000 of the purchase price would be held back and placed in escrow. See id The held back
funds was subject to post-closing adjustments to the CDNW, more specifically, the parties
agreed that if the dealership's CDNW was less than $800,000, Dillon would be paid the
difference between the CDNW and $800,000, not to exceed the $200,000 held in escrow. See id
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Alternatively, if the CDNW was greater than $800,000 then Montgomery would be paid the
difference and any remainder of the held back funds would be paid out according to the
agreement. See
In addition, the parties adopted a method of resolving any disputes they had with regards
to the valuation of the CDNW. See id. They agreed if they were not able to agree on the
CDNW, the matter would be referred to accounts who would retain qualified experts to assist in
the determination. See id.
Following the closing, both parties had their appraisers calculate the CDNW, but they
were unable to resolve the differing appraisals and the accountants could not agree the other's
figures. See id Dillon suggested an expert to assist the accountants in valuing the inventory, but
Montgomery did not agree with the expert. See id Likewise, Montgomery suggested an expert
which Dillon refused to accept. See id. The parties accountants agreed to engage an independent
accountant to make the determination of the CDNW. See id. The independent accountant was
unable to reconcile the three appraisals and resigned. See id
Dillon filed suit against Montgomery alleging breach of contract, requested a refund of
the money held back in escrow, sought of declaration of the rights and duties under the
agreement and a determination of the CDNW. In the court trial, the district court determined 3
issues were unresolved and needed to be addressed: 1) the actual cash value of the used car
inventory; 2) the calculation of the new car inventory as by the manufacturer's holdback; and 3)
the treatment of the obsolete parts and accessories. See id. The district court found that the
CDNW was less than $600,000 and that Dillon was entitled to the held back funds in escrow plus
accumulated interest. See id. The district court further found that Montgomery breached the
parties' agreement and awarded prejudgment interest. See id Montgomery appealed the
awarded of prejudgment interest arguing that amount of damages were not liquidated or capable
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of mathematical computation and therefore the district court erred in awarding Dillon
prejudgment interest. See id., 138 Idaho at 616-17, 67 P.3d at 95-96.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court expressed the following:
Idaho Code§ 28-22-104 allows for prejudgment interest at a rate of twelve
percent per year in cases of money due on an express contract. Prejudgment
interest can be awarded as a matter of law from the date the sum became due in
cases where the amount claimed, even though not liquidated, is capable of
mathematical computation. (Citation omitted).
The district court found that an award of prejudgment interest to Dillon was
"proper 'in order to fully compensate an injured party from the loss of use of
their money during the pendency of this action.' (Citation omitted). The
district court then determined
The contract amount was readily ascertainable at the time of the breach; the
contract provisions clearly set forth the manner of determining how the
holdback should be addressed and released. At the time the breach occurred,
both parties knew how the amounts would be computed. Furthermore, the
claim is a liquidated claim, because the evidence furnished data which made it
possible to compute the amount owed with exactness and without reliance on
opinion or discretion. In addition, the fact the case was disputed does not
change the Court's decision to award prejudgment interest. As the Idaho
Courts have ruled:
If a decision to award interest is based on whether the claim was
disputed or litigated, " ... prejudgment interest would never be
awarded - a party could delay payment without incurring interest
expense by disputing and litigating any claim." (Citation omitted) ... A
party could delay payment, waiting until trial to challenge the
reasonableness of costs to avoid prejudgment interest, and prejudgment
interest would only be allowed in rare circumstances. (Citation omitted).
The district court in denying Montgomery's motion for reconsideration further
stated:
In this case, the method for determining the dealership's inventory value
was clearly established in the contract. Furthermore, the contract also
established a method of addressing disagreements short of a suit. As the
Court found, Mr. Montgomery breached his contract in several
significant ways. He failed to use the appropriate method for establishing
the used vehicle inventory. He failed to follow the contract's method for
resolving the parties' differences. And he made every effort to thwart
Mr. Dillon's effort to resolve the problems.
The Court would further find that he should not be able to avoid
prejudgment interest by simply breaching the contract and then arguing
the value was to be determined by the Court. In this case, the damages
were easily ascertainable as of the date of the breach by simple
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mathematical calculation. Id, 138 Idaho at 617-18, 67 P.3d at 96-97.
(Emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court further elaborated on the

the case

support of the

district court's decision:
The parties' agreement clearly laid out the process for the parties to determine the
value of the new vehicle inventory, used vehicle inventory, demonstrator vehicles,
parts and accessories, gas, oil, grease and body shop inventories and other
miscellaneous inventories. The agreement had a contingency plan for the
situation that arose here, in case the parties would be unable to agree on the
CDNW. The amendment further addressed if the parties could not agree on the
CDNW that a properly qualified expert, such as Idaho auto Auction, would be
sought to assist in making the determination, with the costs of such expert borne
equally between the parties.
Montgomery argues that it was necessary to present a great amount of evidence
and expert testimony to the district court in order for the trial court to make a
determination of the CDNW and that, therefore, the damages may not have been
readily capable of mathematical computation. (Citation omitted). However, the
contract between Dillon and Montgomery set forth a procedure for easily
determining the actual cash value of the automobiles. The parties were to
follow the steps set forth in the contract and if the CDNW was less than
$800,000 then the difference would be paid to Dillon, up to $200,000 and if
greater than $800,000, the amount would be given to Montgomery; the
$200,000 Closing Date Holdback was a liquidated sum. All the parties
needed to do was add up the figures. We conclude that the amount upon
which prejudgment interest was based was easily ascertainable by
mathematical calculation.
This Court holds that the damages would have been capable of mathematical
computation but for Montgomery's breach. (Citation omitted). The district
court's award of prejudgment interest is affirmed. Id., 138 Idaho at 618, 67 P.3d
at 97. (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, the facts are nearly identical to those facts found in Dillon. Jackson
Hop and Farm Bureau entered into an insurance contract where Farm Bureau agreed to insure
Jackson Hop's dryer buildings and fixtures/equipment for a fire loss for the policy limit amount
of $1,600,000 in exchange for a premium amount to be paid by Jackson Hop. 6

6

See, R. Vol. 2, pp. 99.
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Per the terms of the insurance contract, Coverage E buildings which Jackson Hop's
buildings and equipment/fixtures were insured, provided the liquidated amount and method for
calculating and determining the value of the loss sustained by the fire. Specifically, the terms of
the policy state:
3. Limit of Liability. Subject to the provisions of this policy, the most we will
pay for loss or damage from any occurrence is the applicable limit of liability
stated in the Declarations, in the policy booklet, or in any applicable
endorsement. 7 (Emphasis Added).
4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the applicable limits stated in the Declarations, in
the policy booklet, or in any applicable endorsement, covered property losses are
settled as follows:
a. Personal property, structures that are not buildings, farm personal
property, and buildings insured under Coverage E, at actual cash value at
the time of the loss but not exceeding the amount necessary to repair or
replace. If repair or replacement results in better than like kind or quality,
the insured must pay for the amount of the betterment. 8
The policy was silent in defining actual cash value, but Idaho law had defined the term as
replacement cost less depreciation. See, Boise Assn. of Credit A1en v. Insurance Co., 44 Idaho
249,256 P. 523 (1927) and Manduca Datsun, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 106 Idaho
163,676 P.2d 1274 (Ct.App.1984).
On September 16, 2012, Jackson Hop's drying buildings and equipment/fixtures were
destroyed by a fire which were rendered a total loss by Farm Bureau. On October 24, 2012,
Jackson Hop submitted its Sworn Proof of Loss provided by Farm Bureau and furnished in
accordance with the terms of the policy. 9
On or about October 26, 2012, Farm Bureau hired Joe Corlett, an appraiser, to prepare an
appraisal of the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment/fixtures destroyed in the fire.

See, R., Vol. 2, p. 135.
See id
9 See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 10 and 29.

7

8
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Mr. Corlett hired Joe Smith, an appraiser, to perform an appraisal on only the equipment/fixtures
lost in the fire. In defining the term "Actual Cash Value," Mr. Corlett relied on a definition
provided by an internet website called Investopedia. 10 Investopedia is not an authoritative
publication relied upon in the appraisal industry. Mr. Corlett's conclusions and opinions of the
actual cash value of the buildings and equipment/fixtures destroyed by the fire were $295,000
and $85,909, respectively. 11
On or about November 28, 2012, Farm Bureau tendered payment in the total amount of
$380,909 as the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment/fixtures destroyed in the fire.
The amount paid for the total loss amounted to less than 25% of the total policy limit amount the
property was insured.
On or about December 14, 2012, Jackson Hop retained its own appraisal report to
determine the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment/fixtures. Based on its
investigation, Jess Payne Appraisal Service concluded and opined that the actual cash value of
the buildings and equipment/fixtures, collectively, came to $1,410,000. 12
Jackson Hop turnover its appraisal report and supporting documentation to Farm Bureau
for its review and reconsideration of the actual cash value of the total loss to its property. Farm
Bureau rejected Jackson Hop's documentation and refused to reconsider the amount it
tendered. 13
On June 18, 2013, Jackson Hop filed suit against Farm Bureau alleging breach of contract
and failure to pay the amount justly due under the policy. In addition to the amount justly due,
Jackson Hop sought relief for an award of attorney fees, costs and prejudgment interest. 14

See,
See,
12 See,
13 See,
14 See,
10
11

R., Vol. 2. p. 168.
R. Vol. 2, pp. 161-191.
R., Vol. 2, pp. 193-236.
R., Vol. 2, pp. 238-243 and 245-46.
R., Vol. l, pp. 4-10
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Pursuant to the insurance policy, the arbitration clause reads, in pertinent part:
Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to liability coverages, or uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverages. An insured or we may make a written
demand for arbitration to determine all disputed issues as to ( 1) whether an
insured is entitled under the policy to coverage for a loss, or (2) the value of a loss
to real or personal property where coverage is not disputed. . . . (Emphasis
added). 15

The parties stipulated to stay the proceedings pending the arbitration and on July 24,
2013, the District Court entered its Order for Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration which
stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will continue to have jurisdiction over
the above entitled litigation and that further proceedings shall be stayed until the
arbitration has been completed, except to the extent that either party seeks this
Court's intervention to resolve any legal issues that the arbitration panel
does not resolve. (Emphasis added).
The matter proceeded to arbitration and discovery was allowed. After the parties'
simultaneously disclosed its expert witnesses and opinions, Farm Bureau's rebuttal expert
opinions of the buildings and equipment/fixtures changed and were increased to $300,000 and
$133,000, respectively. On January 21, 2014, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop an undisputed
additional sum of $38,239 for the buildings and $47,091 for the equipment/fixtures. As of
January 21, 2014, Farm Bureau paid a combined total amount of $466,239 for the actual cash
value of the buildings and equipment/fixtures. 16
A four day evidentiary hearing was held and conducted on February 11 through February
14, 2014. On or about February 21, 2014, a unanimous arbitration award was entered finding the
actual cash value of the buildings at $740,000 and equipment/fixtures at $315,000 for a total
arbitration award of $1,055,000. 17 In reaching its award, the arbitration panel found that Farm

See R., Vol 2, p. 122.
See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 16-17.
17 See, R., Vol. 1, pp. 32-36 and Vol. 3, pp. 355-359.

15

16
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Bureau's selected appraisers' opinions were not credible or persuasive. 18
Jackson Hop petitioned to confirm the arbitration award and moved for an award of its
attorney fees, costs and prejudgment interest On May 19, 2014, the District Court entered its
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming the arbitration award and awarding Jackson Hop
its attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839, but denying its request for costs and
prejudgment interest. On the issue of prejudgment interest, the District Court held that Jackson
Hop could not recover prejudgment interest on its arbitration award because the damages were
not liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical processes or computation. 19 On June 19,
2014, the District Court entered Judgment accordingly. 20
The facts in the instant case are parallel to those found in the Dillon decision in a number
of aspects:
1) Both parties entered an agreement or contract that laid out the process to determine
the value of the.property. Here, Farm Bureau's policy provided a methodology of
actual cash value. 21
2) Similar to Dillon where three independent appraisers and accountants could not
reconcile and resolve the differences between the values, Farm Bureau and Jackson
Hop's experts had differing opinions of value that the parties could not agree upon.
3) The agreement provided a contingency plan if the parties could not agree on the
amount of the actual cash value of the property. Here, Farm Bureau's policy
provided an arbitration clause. 22

18

See id.
See, R.,
20 See, R.,
21 See, R.,
22 See, R.,
19

Vol.
Vol.
Vol.
Vol.

3, pp. 422-37.
3, pp. 438-39.
2, p. 135.
2, p. 122.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 33

4) In Dillon, the Court found the held back funds of $200,000 was a liquidated sum.
Here, the policy specifically stated that the most Farm Bureau would pay for a loss
was

applicable limit of liability on the Declaration page which in this case was

$1,600,000 which too amounts to a liquidated sum. 23
5)

Like Montgomery, Farm Bureau chose not to follow the legal methodology for
determining actual cash value according to Idaho case law, but instead elected to
utilize a definition from an unauthoritative internet website to determine the value and
thereafter it would not consider any further evidence provided by Jackson Hop which
resulted in the lawsuit and subsequent arbitration proceeding. 24

If Cranney, supra, adopted the standard set forth in Dillon as the legal standard for an
award of prejudgment interest in a first party insurance claim and the factual basis in support of
the Dillon Court's decision to affirm the district court's award of prejudgment interest is closely
identical to the undisputed facts herein, then logically as a matter of law, Jackson Hop should
have been entitled to prejudgment interest on the arbitration award. Therefore, as a matter of
law, the District Court erred in denying Jackson Hop an award of prejudgment interest on the
grounds that the damages were not liquidated or readily ascertainable by mathematical
computation. Jackson Hop respectfully request this Court enter its Order reversing the District
Court's denial of prejudgment interest and remand the case back with instruction to grant
Jackson Hop an award of prejudgment interest in the amount of$100,407.24 as reflected in the
Court's record. 25

See, R., Vol. 2, p. 99 and p. 135.
See, R., Vol. 2, p. 168.
25 See, R. Vol. I, p. 27.
23

24
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D. The Arbitration Panel did not have the authority to award preiudgment
interest under the policy.
The District Court did not specifically rule on the issue, but it is anticipated that Farm
Bureau will argue that pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-910 and the Court's decision in Wolfe v. Farm

Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398,913 P.2d 1168 (1996), the Arbitration Panel had the authority to
award prejudgment interest and because the arbitration award was silent on the issue, the District
Court did not have the authority to include an award of prejudgment interest to the arbitration
award. Generally, this is a correct proposition of law, however, the policy at issue limited the
Arbitration Panel's authority.
Idaho Code§ 7-910 of Uniform Arbitration Act states:

Fees and expenses of arbitration. - Unless otherwise provided in the agreement
to arbitrate, the arbitrators' expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not
including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as
provided in the award. (Emphasis added).
In Wolfe, the Court held that Idaho Code § 7-910 granted arbitrators the authority to
award expenses, fees and other expenses which included prejudgment interest and costs of
arbitration, absent a contrary agreement between the parties. See id., 128 Idaho at 403, 913 P.2d
at 1173.
In the instant case, the arbitration clause in Farm Bureau's policy reads, in pertinent part:
Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to liability coverages, or uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverages. An insured or we may make a written
demand for arbitration to determine all disputed issues as to (1) whether an
insured is entitled under the policy to coverage for a loss, or (2) the value of a loss
to real or personal property where coverage is not disputed. . . . (Emphasis
added). 26
The arbitration clause provided two alternatives for which an arbitration panel could
decide. The first alternative was whether the insured had coverage under the policy. In this case,

26

See R., Vol 2, p. 122.
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it was undisputed that Jackson Hop had coverage for the fire loss to its buildings and equipment.
The second alternative only authorized the Arbitration Panel to determine "the value of a loss to
real or personal property where coverage is not disputed," nothing more, nothing less. The
insurance policy's arbitration clause limited the Arbitration Panel's authority to only decide the
value of the loss. It did not authorize the Arbitration Panel to determine an award of costs,
attorney fees or prejudgment interest, therefore Idaho Code§ 7-910 is not applicable or
controlling in this case.
In addition, after Jackson Hop filed its lawsuit against Farm Bureau, the parties executed
a stipulation to stay proceedings pending the arbitration. On July 24, 2013, the District Court
entered its Order for Stay of Proceedings Pending Arbitration which stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court will continue to have jurisdiction over
the above entitled litigation and that further proceedings shall be stayed until the
arbitration has been completed, except to the extent that either party seeks this
Court's intervention to resolve any legal issues that the arbitration panel
does not resolve. (Emphasis added).
Accordingly, the District Court continued to have jurisdiction and authority to resolve
any legal issues that the arbitration panel did not consider which included an award of
prejudgment interest which was part of the relief sought in Jackson Hop's Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial. 27 The only question decided by the Arbitration Panel which the policy
authorized was: "What is the total insured loss suffered by the claiming party on account of the
fire damage to the buildings and hops processing equipment located on the property of the
claiming party and insured by the responding part, under the terms of the fire insurance policy
then in force, in the fire that occurred on September 12, 2012. " 28 Based on the policy language,

27
28

See, R., Vol. 1, p. 7.
See, R., Vol. 1, p. 33.
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the arbitrators were not granted the authority to award any costs, fees or other expenses
prescribed in Idaho Code § 7-910.
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that "[B]ecause

contracts are adhesion

contracts, typically not subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that exists in the
contract must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Weinstein v. Prudential Property
& Cas., 149 Idaho 299,321,233 P.3d 1221 (2010) (quotingArmstrongv. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 69,205 P.3d 1203, 1205 (2009)).

In Schilling v. Allstate Insurance Co., 132 Idaho 927, 929-30, 980 P.2d 1014, 1016-17
(1999), the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following in construing insurance contracts:
It is well established that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion which are
interpreted according to the plain meaning of the words employed here the policy
language is clear and unambiguous. (Citation omitted).However, it is also
fundamental that insurance contracts are to be construed against the drafter and
resolved against the insurer where there is ambiguity in interpreting insurance
exclusions. (Citation omitted). This Court has further stated:
It is long established precedent of this Court to view insurance contracts in
favor of their general objectives rather than on a basis of strict technical
interpretation of language found therein. Where language may be given two
meanings, one of which permits recovery and the other does not, it is to be
given the construction most favorable to the insured. Stated somewhat
differently, an insurance contract is to be construed most favorably to the
insured and in such a manner as to provide full coverage for the indicated
risks rather than to narrow protection. This Court will not sanction a
construction of the insurer's language that will defeat the very purpose or
object of the insurance. (Citation omitted).
Here, Farm Bureau, as the drafter of the policy, could have clearly and concisely written
in its arbitration clause that the arbitrators would decide all issues, in addition to the value of the
loss. Instead, Farm Bureau elected not to include such language in its policy. The insurance
policy set forth the agreement between the parties in this case and failing to clearly and concisely
articulate the issues for which the arbitration panel could decide created an ambiguity in the
policy for which Idaho law requires the ambiguity to be construed against Farm Bureau.
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V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Jackson Hop is asserting and claiming its reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred on
pursuant to

40 and I.A.R 41 and pursuant to Idaho Code§

-1839.

Attorney fees are awardable only where they are authorized by statute or contract Heller
v. Cenarussa, 106 Idaho 571,682 P2d 524 (1984).

Specifically, Idaho Code§ 41-1839 is titled "Allowance of attorney's fees in suits against
or in arbitration with insurers" reads, in relevant part:
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance,
surety, guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever that fails to pay a
person entitled thereto within thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been
furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, or to pay to the
person entitled thereto within sixty (60) days if the proof of loss pertains to
uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist coverage benefits, the amount that
person is justly due under such policy, certificate or contract shall in any action
thereafter commenced against the insurer in any court in this state, or in any
arbitration for recovery under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract,
pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's
fees in such action or arbitration. (Emphasis added).
LC § 41-183 9 creates additional compensation to the insured under the terms of the

insurance policy itself should the insured recover more than the amount originally tendered and
paid by the insurer within the time period prescribed.

The fees to be awarded are just

compensation---not a penalty against the insurer. The payment of attorney's fees is required in
order to make the insured whole. If the insured is forced into court or arbitration and must incur
the expenses of litigation in order to get what is rightfully theirs under the policy, they will be
deprived of part of that compensation to which they were entitled. The purpose of the statute is
to provide an incentive for insurers to settle claims in order to reduce the amount of litigation and
the high costs associated with litigation and to prevent the sum that is due the insured under the
policy from being diminished by expenditures for services of an attorney. See, Holland v. Metro.
Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co. (In re Estate of Holland), 153 Idaho 94,279 P.3d 80 (2012).
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Idaho law has consistently awarded a prevailing insured his attorney fees incurred on
appeal under Idaho Code§ 41-1839. See, Parsons v. }vfutual of Enumclaw
1

143 Idaho

P.3d 614 (2007). See also, 1t1artin v. State Farm A1utual Automobile Insurance

supra.; Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 89 Idaho 293,404 P.2d 634 (1965).

Based on Idaho Code§ 41-1839, the case law and arguments presented herein, Jackson
Hop respectfully requests an award of its reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.

VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing case law, statutory authority and arguments above, Jackson Hop
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's denial of prejudgment interest
and remand the matter with instructions to award prejudgment interest as reflected in the record.
DATED this

6-#.. day of November, 2014.
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